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Intimately Related to the Criminal Process: 
Examining the Consequences of a Conviction After 
Padilla v. Kentucky and State v. Sandoval 
Travis Stearns 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, the US Supreme Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky that effective 
assistance of counsel required that a criminal defense attorney provide 
affirmative advice for noncitizen clients who faced immigration 
consequences in their pleas or sentences.1 On March 17, 2011, the 
Washington State Supreme Court issued State v. Sandoval, which analyzed 
Padilla and found that counsel’s advice to his client “fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness” when he downplayed the immigration 
consequences of his client’s conviction.2 While both of these cases deal 
specifically with the immigration advice for noncitizen clients, they provide 
a framework for analyzing what effective assistance of counsel means for 
criminal defense attorneys when providing advice on a sentence or plea 
bargain.  
This article will examine not only immigration but also other 
consequences that result from a criminal conviction in Washington. It will 
argue that instead of analyzing a consequence as direct or collateral, the 
court must now determine whether a consequence is intimately related to 
the criminal process or an integral part of the penalty. When found to be an 
integral part of the penalty, an attorney must give affirmative advice 
regarding that consequence. Finally, this article will examine those 
consequences that are traditionally termed “direct,” such as incarceration 
and supervision, and those that have been considered “collateral,” like 
employment, registration, and driver’s license restrictions. This article will 
look at what it means to give affirmative advice about these consequences 
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and then provide some advice on what competent counsel should do when 
faced with a particular issue. 
Padilla held that an attorney has an obligation to provide affirmative 
advice on the consequences of a conviction that are “intimately related to 
the criminal process” and an “integral part of the penalty.”3 Sandoval made 
clear that when a plea involves obvious immigration consequences, it falls 
below the objective standard of reasonableness for an attorney to not give 
affirmative advice regarding those consequences to a noncitizen client.4 
Both Sandoval and Padilla deal with the issue of advising a noncitizen 
client on immigration consequences, but neither examined other 
consequences in detail.5 Importantly, Padilla left open the broader issue of 
when affirmative advice for other consequences of a conviction is required, 
recognizing that the Court had never distinguished between direct and 
collateral consequences in defining the scope of constitutionally 
“reasonable professional assistance” required under Strickland v. 
Washington.6 In fact, the Court specifically declined to reach the issue of 
whether the distinction between “direct” and “collateral” was an appropriate 
way to examine conviction consequences.7 
As a result of Padilla’s rule requiring affirmative advice for immigration 
consequences and the court’s decision to not reach the broader issue, state 
and federal courts are grappling with whether to extend Padilla beyond the 
issue of immigration consequences.8 While Washington State courts have 
not yet examined whether Padilla applies to other consequences, other 
courts extended this rule, including advice regarding post-release 
commitment hearings,9 loss of pension,10 sex offender registration 
requirements,11 parole eligibility,12 and eligibility for early release from 
prison for good behavior.13 In all of these instances, the reviewing courts 
have extended Padilla beyond immigration and held that effective 
assistance requires affirmative advice with regard to these important 
consequences.14 
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The commonality in all of these cases is that competent counsel requires 
an understanding of the potential consequences of a sentence and an 
obligation to provide affirmative advice with regard to those consequences 
when it matters to that client.15 Competent representation requires that an 
attorney discuss what matters to their individual client and then attempt to 
craft a specific resolution that comports with the client’s stated goals.16 
Only those consequences that impact the individual client should be 
considered “integral to the penalty.”17 As consequences and clients are 
unique in every legal situation, it is not possible to say which consequences 
will matter in any particular case. Instead, competent counsel must take the 
time to consider which consequences are relevant whenever they represent a 
new client. 
II. THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
A.  Establishing Effective Assistance of Counsel at Sentencing: Strickland v. 
Washington 
In Strickland, the Supreme Court established that the Sixth Amendment 
of the US Constitution required that an attorney must provide effective 
assistance of counsel at sentencing, holding that the defendant is entitled to 
relief where there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.18 Strickland established a two-prong test to determine whether a 
defendant was entitled to withdraw a guilty plea.19 The test requires the 
defendant to establish that counsel’s representation fell “below an objective 
standard of reasonableness,”20 and that there was a “reasonable probability 
that, but-for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings 
would have been different.”21 
Washington State courts examined Strickland prior to Padilla with regard 
to the consequences of a conviction, but courts only applied the Strickland 
test to direct consequences including incarceration, fines, and criminal 
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history.22 Where a defendant could establish prejudice with respect to direct 
consequences, Washington courts strictly applied the Strickland test, 
finding that effective assistance was required by Sixth Amendment of the 
US Constitution and Article 1, Section 22 of the Washington State 
Constitution.23 Prior to Sandoval, failure to advise a client on a traditionally 
termed collateral consequence could not be the basis for ineffective 
assistance of counsel in Washington.24 It was only where the attorney 
actually misinformed the client of a consequence that a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel could be made.25  
This analysis resulted in uneven and result-oriented rulings by the court 
that could be considered inconsistent with each other. For example, In re 
Isadore held that the failure to advise about community custody could result 
in a finding of ineffective assistance,26 but State v. Music held that the 
failure to advise that the parole board could examine criminal history 
(which might result in a longer sentence) was collateral and not subject to a 
finding of ineffective assistance.27 Furthermore, Washington State courts 
excluded immigration advice from being the basis of a claim of ineffective 
assistance, finding that deportation was collateral to the conviction and 
could only be the basis for withdrawal of a plea where the client was 
affirmatively misadvised.28 
B.  Washington’s Commitment to Effective Assistance of Counsel: Council 
on Public Defense, RCW 10.101, State v. A.N.J., and CrR3.1 
The Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) established the Blue 
Ribbon Commission on Criminal Defense in 2003 to address concerns 
about the quality of indigent defense services in Washington.29 As a result 
of the work done by the commission, the WSBA adopted Indigent Defense 
Standards in 2007.30 The Indigent Defense standards are based upon 
standards created by the Washington Defender Association (WDA) that 
established—among other important principles—parity of pay with 
prosecutors, maximum caseloads, the requirement of training, and 
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experience levels in order to handle a particular type of case.31 The 
commitment of the WSBA to improving public defense continues as the 
Blue Ribbon Commission has now been established as permanent part of 
the WSBA, known as the Council on Public Defense.32 
The legislature has also shown its commitment to improving public 
defense.33 RCW 10.101.030 requires each county to establish standards for 
the delivery of public defense services.34 Counties must set standards for 
compensation, caseload limits, qualifications, supervision, and training, 
among other qualifications.35 The legislature created this rule because 
“effective legal representation must be provided for indigent persons . . . 
consistent with the constitutional requirements of fairness, equal protection, 
and due process.”36 The Washington State Office of Public Defense (OPD), 
whose mission is “to implement the constitutional and statutory guarantees 
of counsel and to ensure the efficiency of indigent defense services,”37 
administers state funds to improve indigent defense services consistent with 
RCW 10.101.38 
Despite these efforts, problems have persisted with regard to effective 
assistance, especially for indigent clients.39 In 2004, the Seattle Times 
highlighted the problems in indigent defense in a series of articles titled 
“The Empty Promise of an Equal Defense.”40 These articles described the 
lack of standards in most Washington counties41 and how it impacted the 
ability of an indigent client to receive effective assistance of counsel. 
Likewise, in 2004, the American Civil Liberties Union ACLU filed a 
lawsuit that challenged the constitutionality of indigent defense services in 
Grant County.42 The court found that it was “virtually uncontested” that 
Grant County “suffered from systemic deficiencies,” and the decision 
resulted in a settlement where the parties agreed to reduce excessive 
caseloads, guarantee that public defense lawyers are qualified to handle 
their cases, and to provide adequate funding for investigators and expert 
witnesses.43 The settlement also created a monitor to ensure compliance 
with the agreement.44 
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The Washington State Supreme Court addressed ineffective assistance of 
counsel in State v. A.N.J., a case decided prior to Padilla.45 The Court 
recognized that “45 years after Gideon,46 we continue our efforts to fulfill 
Gideon’s promise” and that “inadequate funding and troublesome limits on 
indigent counsel have made the promise of effective assistance of counsel 
more myth than fact, more illusion than substance.”47 A.N.J. held that 
intelligently and voluntarily entering a plea of guilty includes assuring that 
the defendant understands the “nature of the charge and the consequences of 
the plea.”48 The concurring opinion further argued that the “judiciary should 
accept no shortcuts when it comes to discharging its constitutional 
obligation to appoint effective attorneys to represent indigent criminal 
defendants.”49 This decision was based upon both the issue of what it means 
to conduct an effective investigation and the requirement that an attorney 
must not misinform a client with regard to the consequence of a 
conviction.50 Among other issues causing the court to conclude that the 
representation had led to a “manifest injustice,” the attorney in this case 
failed to advise his client that the conviction could never be removed from 
his record.51 
Further demonstrating Washington’s commitment to ensure that indigent 
persons are provided with competent counsel, the Court amended CrR 3.1, 
CrRLJ 3.1, and JuCR 3.1 to include the requirement that all attorneys who 
provide representation to indigent persons must certify their compliance 
with the applicable WSBA Standards for Indigent Defense Services.52 
While the Court has not yet determined the applicable standards that an 
attorney must certify to, the Court intended for this certification process to 
ensure that all lawyers have the resources necessary to provide competent 
representation.53 The WSBA Board of Governors, among other criteria, 
have recommended to the Supreme Court that these standards include, for 
the first time, a maximum number of cases that an attorney can handle in a 
year when they represent indigent persons.54 These standards are intended 
to go into effect in full in 2013.55 
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C. Establishing a Standard for Consequences that are “Intimately Related 
to the Criminal Process” in Padilla v. Kentucky 
In Padilla, the US Supreme Court analyzed what it means to provide 
effective assistance to a noncitizen when giving advice on a charge that will 
result in deportation.56 Padilla focused on the changes in immigration law 
since the Court examined immigration issues in Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan.57 
The Court recognized the “drastic measure” of deportation or removal to a 
noncitizen in Fong Haw Tan,58 and that under current immigration law and 
policy, deportation or removal is “virtually inevitable for a vast number of 
noncitizens convicted of crimes.”59 
The Court rejected the argument that as a collateral consequence, 
immigration consequences were not subject to an analysis under the rules of 
effective assistance of counsel; instead, it held that “counsel must inform 
her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation.”60 Importantly, the 
Court did not limit this holding to immigration consequences, writing that it 
had “never applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences 
to define the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional 
assistance.’”61 Because of the nature of immigration consequences, the 
Court declined to reach the broader issue.62 
Instead, Padilla focused on how the immigration consequences of a 
conviction were “intimately related to the criminal process” and “an integral 
part of the penalty.”63 The importance of this opinion to noncitizens facing 
criminal charges is clear. The Court recognized that immigration charges 
were civil in nature.64 Nonetheless, because the consequences were 
“intimately related to the criminal process,” it was ineffective assistance 
when an attorney failed to provide affirmative advice on the immigration 
consequences of criminal charges.65 
Padilla intentionally left open the question of whether this analysis can 
be applied to other consequences.66 The Court specifically held that the 
distinction was “ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the 
specific risk of deportation.”67 It makes sense that this analysis can be 
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applied to other consequences, too. Those consequences that meet the 
standard set by Padilla and are “intimately related to the criminal process” 
should be subject to a Strickland analysis; those that do not meet that 
standard should not be able to withdraw a plea for failure to advise on that 
consequence.68 
D. Applying Padilla in Washington: State v. Sandoval 
Washington is one of the first states to apply Padilla to consequences 
formerly considered to be “collateral.” In Sandoval, defense counsel 
advised his client that “he would not be immediately deported and that he 
would then have sufficient time to retain proper immigration counsel to 
ameliorate any potential immigration consequences of his guilty plea.”69 
Sandoval stated, “I trusted my attorney to know that what he was telling me 
was the truth.”70 
The court found that “Sandoval’s counsel during the plea process “fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness”71 and “was constitutionally 
incompetent because his advice regarding the immigration consequences of 
Sandoval’s plea impermissibly downplayed the risks.”72 Importantly, 
because the immigration consequences of the particular plea that Sandoval 
accepted were “truly clear,” it was not necessary to examine whether the 
attorney had an “obligation to ‘satisfy the interests’ of the client, perhaps by 
‘plea bargain[ing] creatively with the prosecutor in order to craft a 
conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation.’”73 
Sandoval left open the issue of an attorney’s additional obligations “if and 
when they are squarely presented.”74 
E.  A Path Forward: Applying Padilla to the Consequences of a Conviction 
That Are “Intimately Related to the Criminal Process” and an “Integral 
Part of the Penalty” 
Padilla established a bright line rule for immigration consequences that 
are truly clear. For such consequences, an attorney must provide their client 
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with affirmative advice. Where the consequence is not clear, the Court 
requires, at a minimum, that “a criminal defense attorney need do no more 
than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a 
risk of adverse immigration consequences.”75 This limitation on the rule 
does not mean that the Court endorses a practice where an attorney should 
only meet this minimal standard. Instead, the Court clearly acknowledged 
that competent representation for noncitizens also means considering the 
adverse implications of a plea when the Court recognized that “’preserving 
the possibility of’ discretionary relief from deportation under § 212(c) of the 
1952 INA…‘would have been one of the principal benefits sought by 
defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to 
trial.’”76 
The question that Padilla did not answer was what an attorney should do 
when a client identifies a consequence as “intimately related to the criminal 
process” and an “integral part of the penalty.” Likewise, Sandoval limited 
its holding to those instances where the immigration consequences are truly 
clear.77 Thus, the issue that will continue to be litigated with regard to 
effective assistance of counsel is what an attorney is obligated to do when 
faced with non-immigration-related consequences that are truly clear.  
Already, other courts have begun to examine this issue. State and federal 
courts analyzing this issue have applied Padilla to issues other than 
immigration rights.78 In Pennsylvania, Padilla has been applied to the loss 
of a teacher’s pension as a consequence of pleading guilty to indecent 
assault.79 Georgia found that it was constitutionally deficient to fail to 
provide advice regarding sex offender registration requirements because of 
the requirements of Padilla.80 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that it was ineffective assistance to fail to advise a client of the civil 
commitment that could result from a sex offense conviction.81 Several states 
have found that Padilla applies to advice regarding parole eligibility and the 
ability to receive good time on a prison sentence.82 These cases all 
demonstrate that the analysis conducted in Padilla can, and certainly is, 
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applied to other consequences, especially those that courts have found to be 
fundamental or related to constitutional rights. These may include the right 
to vote, serve on a jury, possess a firearm, create and remain with your 
family, and serve in the military.83 Likewise, those consequences which 
result in “drastic measures,” including registration as a sex offender, the 
imposition of legal financial obligations, losing the ability to work, losing 
the right drive a vehicle, losing stable housing, and losing the ability to seek 
an education may also fall within the Padilla’s definition of “integral part” 
of the penalty.84 Where the consequence may result in drastic measures for 
the client, competent representation requires affirmative advice.85 
III. CONSEQUENCES OF A CONVICTION IN WASHINGTON STATE 
Effective assistance of counsel does not require an attorney to consider 
all of the consequences of a conviction when advising a client about a plea 
bargain.86 Instead, effective assistance means listening to the client, 
determining what the client’s goals are in the case, and then crafting a 
disposition that is consistent with those goals. While most persons will be 
concerned about the amount of time that they must spend in jail or on 
supervision, these are not necessarily the only goals or even, in some 
circumstances, the primary concerns that some clients will have in 
resolution of their cases.87 Among other important consequences are 
registration, criminal history, immigration, legal financial obligations, 
firearm possession, employment, housing, public benefits, family rights, 
driver’s license restrictions, loss of civil rights, federal student loans, 
military service, and traveling abroad. The remainder of this article 
discusses these consequences in fuller detail, touching on what attorneys 
should know as they give legal advice regarding each consequence. 
A. Immigration 
Recognized as an “integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important 
part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants,” 
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effective assistance of counsel requires a competent attorney to 
appropriately advise noncitizen clients with regard to the immigration 
consequences of their convictions.88 In Padilla, the Supreme Court rejected 
the reasoning that deportation was a collateral consequence of a conviction 
and, as a result, fell outside of the Sixth Amendment obligation of effective 
assistance of counsel.89 The Court noted that it never adopted the collateral 
consequences doctrine as a benchmark for ineffective assistance.90 Instead, 
the Court held that because of the “close connection to the criminal 
process,” attorneys have an affirmative obligation to advise their clients 
with respect to the immigration consequences of a plea.91 After Padilla’s 
holding, the “importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of 
crimes has never been more important.” 92 
Padilla directs attorneys to provide affirmative advice with regard to the 
consequences of a conviction when analyzing the impact of a conviction on 
a noncitizen defendant.93 When the immigration consequences are clear, 
defense counsel has a duty to provide advice that is “equally clear.”94 Even 
where the law is not “succinct and straightforward,” competent counsel 
must still advise clients that the criminal charges “may carry a risk of 
adverse immigration consequences.”95 
Unlike Padilla, which only addresses the issue of whether representation 
for a noncitizen client “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 
the Washington State Supreme Court analyzed prejudice in Sandoval and 
found that because “Sandoval would have been rational to take his chances 
at trial, . . . counsel’s unreasonable advice prejudiced him.”96 This important 
step forward sets a framework for what attorneys ought to do when 
representing a noncitizen client and recognizes that the risk of “banishment 
or exile”97 and “separation from their families”98 can be more important 
than incarceration for noncitizen defendants.99 
For many criminal defense attorneys, much about immigration law is not 
clear, and the struggle to become competent without support from an 
immigration specialist is challenging.100 States are working to determine the 
866 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
POST-PADILLA CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
appropriate model for providing assistance, which includes creating a 
central resource counsel system, an in-house attorney, or working with 
contract counsel.101 Most Washington State public defenders work under the 
central resource model, with the Washington Defender Association 
Immigration Project (WDAIP) acting as the central resource for attorneys 
seeking current information about the immigration effects of criminal 
convictions.102 Over the course of the last ten years, WDAIP has handled 
over 12,000 individual case consultations, provided over one hundred 
trainings, and worked with more than 5,000 participants on the immigration 
consequences of a crime.103 To be competent on this issue, the best thing 
that an attorney can do is consult with an immigration law specialist, either 
through WDAIP or someone else. 
B. Sentencing and Incarceration 
While Padilla focuses on immigration, the primary concern for most 
persons accused of crimes is the question of incarceration, regardless of 
what other consequences they may be facing.104 Incarceration is a direct 
consequence of a conviction, and there is no question that the Strickland 
analysis applies when an attorney fails to properly advise a client with 
respect to the length of a sentence the client will serve.105 For almost every 
person accused of a crime, this is the primary concern regardless of the 
other consequences they may face.106 In every case, it is expected that the 
attorney shall give affirmative advice with regard to this consequence.107 
In Washington State, felonies and misdemeanors are sentenced 
differently.108 Courts must abide by the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA)109 
for felony convictions, which restricts how a court can impose a sentence. 
For misdemeanor offenses, the court may impose any term up to the 
statutory maximum.110 
For felonies, the court must impose a sentence within the standard range 
set in RCW 9.94A unless it finds “substantial and compelling” reasons to 
justify an exceptional sentence.111 In order to determine the standard range 
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for a sentence, the court examines the seriousness level of the crime112 and 
the defendant’s criminal history.113 Once the court has determined the 
offender’s score based upon those two factors, the court is bound, except for 
exceptional circumstances, to impose a sentence within the standard 
range.114 The court may impose a sentence outside the standard range when 
it complies with statutory and constitutional provisions.115 Where a sentence 
enhancement is pled and proven, the court is also obligated to impose the 
enhancement in addition to any time imposed within the standard range.116 
For sentences above the standard range that are not based solely on criminal 
history, a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that there is an 
exceptional circumstance before the sentence may be imposed.117 Finally, 
where the court finds mitigating circumstances, the court may impose a 
sentence below the standard range.118 
While most felony sentences are determinate, some sex offenders may be 
subject to an indeterminate sentence where the maximum term of their 
incarceration is the statutory maximum for the offense.119 Persistent 
offenders—those who have committed “two-strike” or “three-strike” 
offenses—face the possibility of life without the possibility of parole if 
convicted of their final strike offense.120 Where a person is convicted of any 
two-strike offense or upon conviction of any new sex offense (except failure 
to register as a sex offender) and has been previously convicted of a two-
strike offense, the person must be sentenced to a “determinate-plus” 
sentence.121 For these offenses, the court must impose a sentence with a 
determinate minimum and an indeterminate maximum sentence, where the 
maximum term of incarceration will be the statutory maximum for the 
offense.122 Determinate-plus sentences are subject to all the same rules as 
other sentences, meaning that sentence enhancements may apply to increase 
the minimum sentence that the court may impose, and the court may impose 
exceptional sentences if authorized.123 
Persistent offender sentences are commonly known as “three-strike” or 
“two-strike” sentences.124 A person who is convicted as a persistent 
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offender must be sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of 
parole.125 Three-strike offenses are defined as “most serious” offenses.126 A 
three-strike offender must have been previously convicted of two “most 
serious” offenses in Washington (or an equivalent offense in another state) 
on at least two prior occasions.127 Two-strike offenders must be convicted 
of specified sex offenses on two separate occasions.128 In both cases, where 
the court finds the defendant to be a persistent offender, the court must 
sentence that person to life without the possibility of parole.129 
Except for offenders serving life without parole sentences or capital 
sentences, all persons incarcerated in Washington are entitled to earned 
release time for “good behavior and good performance” while 
incarcerated.130 For offenses committed after July 1, 2003, earned release 
time may reduce a sentence by 10 to 33 percent.131 To be eligible for release 
prior to the completion of their sentenced time, the person must provide the 
Department of Corrections (DOC) with an approved residence and release 
plan.132 Earned release time may not be credited against some sentence 
enhancements, including firearm and deadly weapon enhancements.133 
Local jails are not subject to the DOC rules in determining how much good 
time may be awarded.134 Good time for offenders sentenced locally may 
vary widely, depending upon the county where that person is sentenced.135 
Misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor sentences are defined by statute.136 
Unlike felony sentencing, there are no guidelines for courts to follow to 
determine appropriate sentences for misdemeanor offenses, which means 
that a person convicted of a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor offense 
may be sentenced from no jail time up to the maximum sentence allowed by 
statute.137 Also, unlike most felony sentences, a court may suspend a 
misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor sentence.138 Failure to comply with the 
terms and conditions of a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor sentence can 
result in the court imposing the suspended or nonexecuted sentence up to 
the maximum allowed for the offense.139 
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C.  Supervision, Community Custody, and the Indeterminate Sentence 
Review Board 
Like incarceration, supervision and parole are considered traditional 
direct consequences of a conviction.140 Especially where a person discovers 
that they are unlikely to be paroled on the charges for which they are 
pleading guilty, it is incumbent upon the attorney to give clear advice to 
every client facing supervision or release conditions after they have 
completed their sentence.141 
Convictions for both felonies and misdemeanors may subject a person to 
supervision.142 The DOC is required to conduct a risk assessment143 before 
requiring that an offender serve community custody for a felony other than 
one for which supervision is mandatory.144 Offenders who are determined to 
be at a high risk to reoffend must be supervised; all others will only be 
supervised if it is required by statute.145 Depending upon the offense, 
supervision for a felony may be from one to three years.146 Persons who are 
convicted of misdemeanors or gross misdemeanors may also be sentenced 
to supervision.147 Persons sentenced to a term of supervision must comply 
with the conditions of supervision,148 and a failure to follow those 
conditions can result in a sanction up to the maximum range of the charge 
for which the person was convicted.149 
Some persons may not be released from incarceration until approved by 
the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB).150 The ISRB oversees 
felony offenders who have committed their crimes prior to July 1, 1984,151 
and some sex offenders who have offense dates after August 31, 2001.152 
For felony offenders who committed their offenses prior to July 1, 1984, the 
ISRB sets the offender’s minimum term, and that offender may not be 
paroled until the ISRB determines that release is appropriate.153 While the 
ISRB also determines whether a person serving a determinate-plus sentence 
may be released to community custody, it is the court that sets the minimum 
term that that offender must serve.154 It is important to advise your client 
that release on a determinate-plus sentence may not occur upon first review. 
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In fact, currently only about 36 percent of those who appear before the 
board at any time are determined to be releasable.155 Offenders who are not 
releasable must wait for their next hearing before being reconsidered for 
release.156 The new minimum term shall not exceed five years for any 
offender subject to ISRB review.157 
D. Registration 
The requirement to register is a long-term consequence that may have a 
serious impact on the future of any person convicted of an offense requiring 
registration.158 Registration makes it challenging to remain employed159 and 
maintain stable housing.160 As registration for many persons may last for 
life, an attorney must give affirmative advice to any client facing the 
possibility of registration.161 An attorney whose client is facing the 
possibility of registration should seek a plea bargain that either eliminates or 
reduces the length of time that a person must be registered.162 Even where 
the attorney can reduce the charge to one that carries a finite period of time 
of required registration, they have improved their client’s circumstances and 
have made it more likely that the client will be able to reintegrate into 
society in the future.163 
Any juvenile or adult who has been convicted of any sex or kidnapping 
offense (or who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity for these 
offenses) must register their address with their county sheriff.164 All 
offenders not in custody will be assessed for their likelihood to reoffend and 
classified according to their risk level.165 A Level I classification (an 
offender who is at low risk to reoffend) entitles the state to disclose 
relevant, necessary, and accurate information to any victim, witness, or 
individual community member who lives near the offender’s residence.166 A 
Level II classification (moderate risk to reoffend) allows disclosure to 
public and private schools, child daycare centers, family daycare providers, 
businesses and organizations that primarily serve children, women or 
vulnerable adults, neighbors, and community groups near where the 
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offender lives, expects to live, or is regularly found.167 A Level III 
classification (high level to reoffend) allows law enforcement to disclose 
information about the offender to the public at large.168 
Failure to register is a felony offense.169 The obligation to register 
continues until the offender has been relieved of the duty to register.170 For 
adult offenders who committed a class C felony offense, the duty to register 
lasts until the person has spent ten consecutive years in the community 
without being convicted of a disqualifying offense.171 For class B felonies, 
the person must meet the same conditions for fifteen years from the last date 
of release from confinement.172 The duty to register for adult offenders 
convicted of a class A offense is for life.173 Juveniles fifteen or older who 
are convicted of a class A sex offense are entitled to relief from registration 
where at least sixty months have passed, so long as they have not 
committed a new sex offense during the sixty months, been found guilty of 
failure to register as a sex offender within the sixty months prior to filing 
the petition and can show by a preponderance of the evidence that they are 
sufficiently rehabilitated to warrant removal from the central registry of sex 
offenders and kidnapping offenders.174 All other juveniles may apply for 
relief when at least twenty-four months have passed since the adjudication 
and completion of any term of confinement for the offense giving rise to the 
duty to register and the juvenile has not been adjudicated or convicted of 
any additional sex offenses or kidnapping offenses.175 To be eligible for 
relief, the juvenile must also demonstrate that he or she has not has not been 
adjudicated or convicted of a failure to register during the twenty-four 
months prior to filing the petition.176 For juveniles who were fifteen or older 
at the time of the offense must also show by clear and convincing evidence 
that they are sufficiently rehabilitated to warrant removal from the central 
registry of sex offenders and kidnapping offenders.177 For juveniles who 
were under the age of fifteen, the standard to warrant removal from 
registration is a preponderance of the evidence.178The requirement to 
register is defined as a collateral consequence because it does not alter the 
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standard of punishment.179 This means that the duty to register, which does 
not follow directly from the conviction, may be imposed for persons 
convicted of crimes that did not include a registration requirement at the 
time of the conviction.180 Nonetheless, its impact is “significant, certain and 
known.”181 Under current law, where a person is misled with regard to this 
consequence, it may be a basis for withdrawal of a plea.182 Analyzed under 
Padilla—which made clear that there is no relevant difference “between an 
act of commission and an act of omission”—whether an attorney 
misadvised or failed to give affirmative advice should be irrelevant to the 
analysis of the attorney’s obligation with regard to registration.183 As it can 
lead to the same separation from family and housing issues similar to those 
in Sandoval, Washington may find that it is “rational” for a defendant to go 
to trial rather than risk long-term registration requirements.184 
E. Criminal History 
While the short-term consequences of serving time in custody is often the 
primary concern of persons facing criminal charges, the long term impacts 
of a criminal record cannot be understated.185 The Washington State Patrol 
(WSP) maintains a database of criminal history, which can be accessed 
online.186 Local criminal justice agencies are required to provide the WSP 
with felony and gross misdemeanor arrest and disposition data.187 This data, 
along with arrests under one year and current pending charges, are available 
to the general public.188 This data can be corrected, if inaccurately reported, 
by filing forms with the WSP Identification and Criminal History 
Section.189 
In limited circumstances, a person may be able to get a conviction, 
favorable disposition, or an arrest vacated, sealed, or expunged from their 
record.190 A person with a vacated conviction may state that they have not 
been convicted of that crime, but if the court file is not destroyed, it may be 
used in a later criminal prosecution.191 A court may seal a record that has 
been vacated or if it finds that “compelling privacy or safety concerns 
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outweigh the public interest in access to the record.”192 Keep in mind that 
although a court has ordered a record to be restricted, it may still be 
accessible under the Public Records Act.193 
Adult felony convictions that occurred after July 1, 1984, may only be 
sealed if they were class B or C offenses that were not violent, sexual, or 
crimes against a person.194 For class B felonies, the person must have lived 
in the community crime-free for at least ten years; for most class C felonies, 
the time period is five years.195 In addition, the person seeking to have their 
record vacated must demonstrate that there are no other pending charges in 
any court in any state or with the federal government, and they have not 
been convicted of any new crime since the date of discharge.196 
Adult misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor sentences may only be 
vacated if no other convictions have been previously vacated and no 
restraining orders were issued in the last five years.197 For domestic 
violence offenses, the person must demonstrate that they were crime-free 
for five years from the completion of all sentencing requirements; for all 
other offenders, the crime free requirement is three years.198 Certain 
misdemeanor offenses are ineligible for vacation under any circumstances, 
including DUIs, certain sex offenses, and violent offenses committed under 
RCW 9.94A.030.199 
The rules for juvenile offenses offer greater ability for sealing and 
vacation.200 Any juvenile conviction, other than sex offenses, may be sealed 
if (1) the petitioner demonstrates that there is no pending proceeding against 
them in any court, and (2) the juvenile has remained crime-free for the 
requisite time period.201 The time period for class A felonies is five years; 
for all other offenses it is two years.202 Restriction to these records is also 
greatly reduced once the juvenile turns twenty-one.203 
Only nonconviction data may be destroyed or expunged from a person’s 
criminal history.204 Such data may be destroyed if the person has no prior 
convictions, no subsequent arrests, and the requisite time period passes.205 
Favorable dispositions may be destroyed after two years; arrest information 
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may be deleted after three years.206 Fingerprint and identifying data may 
also be destroyed if eligibility requirements are met.207 This does not, 
however, mean that this information will be erased from all databases.208 It 
is extremely unlikely that all data will ever be destroyed, given the fact that 
it is so easily and widely disseminated at the beginning of a case.209 
The most important things an attorney can do with regard to criminal 
history is make it clear to their client that what they are pleading guilty to 
will result in criminal history and to ensure the client understands what a 
conviction record means.210 
F. Legal Financial Obligations211 
One of the most serious long-term consequences of a conviction are the 
Legal Financial Obligations (LFOs) imposed whenever a person is 
convicted of a crime.212 LFOs include restitution, fines, and fees that are 
assessed in superior court cases regardless of a person’s ability to pay.213 
While many are not mandatory, courts must impose some LFOs, including 
the Victim Penalty Assessment214 and the DNA Collection Fee.215 LFOs are 
an important barrier to the reintegration process, including finding housing, 
employment, and maintaining good credit.216  
Even for those men and women with unpaid LFOs who do not end 
up back behind bars, their substantial legal debts pose a significant, 
and at times insurmountable, barrier as they attempt to reenter 
society. They see their incomes reduced, their credit ratings 
worsen, their prospects for housing and employment dim, and their 
chances of ending up back in jail or prison increase.217  
As a result, defense counsel must be aware of the potential LFOs that can be 
assessed in their clients’ cases and should seek to limit the impact of the 
LFOs on their clients’ futures. 
When negotiating a case, attorneys should keep in mind that LFOs are 
“an important barrier to the reintegration process.”218 Legal debt potentially 
limits income and has an effect on credit ratings, “which in turn [may] limit 
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a person’s ability to secure stable housing.”219 Furthermore, LFOs begin 
accruing interest from the judgment’s date of entry at a 12 percent rate 
applicable to civil judgments, although a person who owes LFOs may seek 
automatic interest waiver for the time they spent incarcerated on the original 
charge.220 Courts may reduce or waive the interest portion of certain LFOs 
under limited circumstances, but “only as an incentive for the offender to 
meet his financial obligations.”221 Given the dangers of limited income, 
effect on credit, and compounded interest, attorneys may improve their 
client’s ability to reintegrate into society by limiting LFOs imposed at 
sentencing. 
Restitution is an obligation owed to an injured party, intended to make 
that party whole for his or her injuries.222 The court should only order 
restitution when a person is convicted of an act that resulted in injury to a 
person or damage to property.223 It is an amount based upon easily 
ascertainable damages,224 and it should not be ordered to provide 
reimbursement for mental anguish, pain and suffering, or other intangible 
losses.225 Restitution may be ordered up to twice the amount the defendant 
gained or the injured party lost as a result of the crime.226 Where 
extraordinary circumstances make restitution inappropriate, courts have the 
power to order no restitution.227 Restitution may not be waived in 
modification hearings, even if you are able to demonstrate that your client 
does not have the ability to pay.228 
Fines are penalties assessed against the defendant as part of his or her 
punishment.229 The maximum penalty that a person can receive depends 
upon the offense for which they are convicted.230 The maximum fine that a 
person can receive for class A felonies is $50,000; for class B felonies, 
$20,000; and for class C felonies, $10,000.231 For gross misdemeanors, the 
maximum fine is $5,000; for a misdemeanor, it is $1,000.232 None of these 
fines are mandatory.233 
Fees are used to pay for many services involved in trial and sentencing, 
including court costs, supervision costs, and incarceration costs.234 Most 
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fines and fees are discretionary; although some, like the DNA collection 
fee235 and the Victim Penalty Assessment,236 must be imposed. When the 
decision to impose LFOs is made at sentencing, the court is directed that it 
“shall not order a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be 
able to pay them.” The court’s decision must take into account “the 
financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that 
payment of costs will impose.”237 This means that the court may waive most 
legal financial obligations based upon inability to pay, unless the court finds 
that there is a future likelihood that the defendant’s indigency will end, 
allowing him or her to pay the LFOs.238 
When able to identify a “manifest hardship,” a person may petition the 
court for remission of some LFOs.239 The movant must demonstrate that the 
LFOs have resulted in a “manifest hardship” to the movant or his or her 
family.240 This is a separate inquiry from the “future likelihood” test 
employed at sentencing, which determines whether the sentenced person 
will ever have the ability to pay.241 At sentencing, the court may impose a 
“conditional obligation” to pay LFOs based upon the future likelihood of 
being able to make such payments.242 Subsequently, “the obligation to repay 
the State accrues only to those who later acquire the means to do so without 
hardship.”243 In other words, “[t]hose who remain indigent or for whom 
repayment would work ‘manifest hardship’ are forever exempt from any 
obligation to repay.”244 A remission hearing is one that takes place at a later 
date, where the movant attempts to demonstrate that they lack the current 
ability to make his or her LFO payments.245 
A person who has willfully failed to pay his or her LFOs may be subject 
to sanctions.246 If the failure to pay is not willful, the court may modify the 
previous order to pay by reducing the monthly payment.247 Due process 
precludes jailing someone for failure to pay a fine if their failure to pay was 
due to that person’s indigence.248 It is only when a person is capable of 
paying but willfully refuses or does not “make sufficient bona fide efforts to 
seek employment or borrow money in order to pay” can the State may 
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imprison him or her.249 While the burden is on the obligor to show that his 
nonpayment is not willful,250 due process still imposes a duty on the court to 
inquire into that person’s ability to pay.251 This inquiry comes at “the point 
of collection and when sanctions are sought for nonpayment.”252 Sanctions 
can range from incarceration to community-based alternatives, depending 
upon the severity of the violation and the availability of resources.253 
As with a criminal conviction, eliminating LFOs for a client is virtually 
impossible. But advocating for only those LFOs which are mandatory and 
limiting their impact are efforts that may have a significant effect on a 
person’s ability to successfully reintegrate into society.254 Where a client 
identifies their inability to pay future LFOs, best practice requires that an 
attorney identify those issues for the court and attempt to mitigate the 
impact of the LFOs. 
G. Firearm Possession 
The right to possess a firearm is based upon the Constitution’s Second 
Amendment and was reaffirmed in District of Columbia v. Heller as a 
fundamental right of citizenship.255 Because the state may restrict the right 
of a person to possess a firearm when they have been convicted of a crime, 
attorneys must give affirmative advice to their clients with respect to this 
consequence.256 Like many of these consequences, there may be little that 
an attorney can do to mitigate removal of this right, as the loss of firearm 
rights is a consequence of all felonies and many misdemeanors.257 Where 
the consequence cannot be avoided, the client must decide whether to plea 
guilty or proceed to trial and face the more drastic consequences that may 
follow upon conviction. 
Under Washington State law, persons convicted of felonies, crimes of 
domestic violence, or persons who have been involuntarily committed are 
prohibited from owning or possessing firearms until their right to do so has 
been reinstated.258 Federal law restricts persons convicted of domestic 
violence,259 fugitives, drug addicts, illegal noncitizens, persons 
878 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
POST-PADILLA CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
dishonorably discharged from the military, and persons subject to domestic 
violence protection orders from possessing firearms.260 In addition, persons 
who have been charged with a felony, but not yet convicted, are prohibited 
by federal law from acquiring a firearm.261 What constitutes a conviction is 
determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the 
proceedings were held. “Any conviction which has been expunged, or set 
aside, or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights 
restored” shall not be considered a conviction unless “such pardon, 
expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the 
person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.”262 
To restore their clients’ firearm rights in Washington, attorneys must first 
determine whether state or federal statutes apply. If a state court renders the 
conviction, state law applies, but some restrictions (like those for violent 
crimes and domestic violence) may only be restored in federal court.263 
Generally, however, a person may petition the court for reinstatement under 
state law if they received a state conviction.264 For a felony offense, the 
person must have remained crime-free in the community for at least five 
years, and the person may not have a prior conviction that prohibits the 
possession of a firearm as part of their offender score.265 Misdemeanor 
offenses require that the individual have been crime-free for three years, all 
conditions of their sentence have been completed, and no prior felony 
convictions are counted as part of the offender score to prohibit the 
possession of a firearm.266 Persons with federal convictions must seek 
restoration of their firearm rights through the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives; although, there currently is no process for doing 
so.267 
For persons facing felonies or misdemeanors that result in the loss of the 
right to possess a firearm, an attorney may be able to craft a plea that results 
in a nondisqualifying conviction. For most felony charges, this may be an 
extremely difficult task unless the prosecutor is willing to reduce the 
charges to a nonqualifying misdemeanor.268 Even with felonies, however, it 
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is possible to resolve a matter with a charge where restoration at some point 
in the future can happen.269 If the right to possess a firearm is identified as 
an important issue by the client, an attorney should attempt to mitigate this 
consequence and, at the very least, provide clear notification with respect to 
the loss of this right.270 
H. Employment 
Losing the ability to hold employment may have an enormous impact on 
a person’s ability to reintegrate into society and become rehabilitated.271 
People with criminal records have a difficult time finding employment, with 
some studies suggesting that at least 65 percent of all employers will not 
knowingly hire an ex-offender, and many routinely check the criminal 
history of their recent hires.272 The Restoration of Employment Rights Act 
prohibits government entities from denying employment or occupational 
licenses because of a felony conviction. There are many exceptions to this 
rule that will be discussed below, but they include exceptions for felonies 
that directly relate to the position of employment sought, positions with the 
treasurer’s office (when the prior conviction involved embezzlement or 
theft), crimes against children specified under RCW 28A.400.322, and for 
health care workers.273 
Criminal background checks are required for persons who are employed 
by, contract with, or are licensed by the Department of Social and Health 
Services (DSHS).274 Crimes against children or other persons275 will 
prohibit persons from working in nursing homes, adult family homes, 
boarding homes, and childcare facilities.276 Crimes of financial 
exploitation277 will also make a person ineligible to work with vulnerable 
adults, e.g., in nursing homes.278 The time limits for ineligibility vary 
depending on the crime committed.279 Persons who have felony convictions 
for crimes against children, “spousal abuse,” or violent crimes will be 
permanently prohibited from contracting with or being licensed by DSHS to 
provide care for children or developmentally disabled individuals.280 
880 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
POST-PADILLA CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
Assault or sex offense convictions not included in the permanent bar (or any 
other felony) will disqualify individuals from licensing, contracting, 
certification, or having unsupervised access to children or individuals with a 
developmental disability for five years.281 
Likewise, schools may deny employment based upon criminal history.282 
School districts and their contractors are required to conduct background 
checks on all employees who will have regular unsupervised access to 
children.283 Crimes against children automatically disqualify persons from 
becoming school employees, contractors with schools, or school bus 
drivers.284 Certified school employees such as teachers are also required to 
have “good moral character,” meaning that they must have no convictions 
in the last ten years, including motor vehicle violations, which “would 
materially and substantially impair the individual’s worthiness and ability to 
serve as a professional within the public and private schools of the state.”285 
Although not required, schools may also request that volunteers provide 
criminal background checks.286 
Washington State law287 also restricts employment with local law 
enforcement in a variety of ways: as a tow truck operator contracting with 
the WSP;288 as a WSP assistance van driver;289 and as an employee or 
volunteer with the Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration.290 In addition, 
any restrictions on possessing a driver’s license or firearm may impact an 
offender’s ability to be employed when possession of these items is a lawful 
condition to employment.291 
Furthermore, federal law prohibits financial institutions from employing 
a person who has been convicted of a crime of dishonesty, breach of trust, 
or theft unless he or she has received written consent from the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation.292 For purposes of this law, pretrial 
diversion or similar programs are considered to be convictions.293 Federal 
law also bars certain classes of felons from working in the insurance 
industry without having received permission from an insurance regulatory 
official;294 holding any of several positions in a union or other organization 
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that manages an employee benefit plan;295 providing healthcare services 
which receive payment from Medicare;296 working for the generic drug 
industry;297 providing prisoner transportation;298 and employment in 
aviation security.299 
In Washington, it is lawful for prospective employers to inquire into 
preconviction data, which includes arrests that were ultimately dismissed.300 
Generally, arrests that are more than ten years old are not subject to 
disclosure.301 Certain agencies and organizations, such as law enforcement, 
state agencies, DSHS, schools, and organizations that have direct 
responsibility for the supervision, care, or treatment of children, mentally ill 
persons, developmentally disabled persons, or other vulnerable adults are 
exempt from the ten-year restriction on disclosure.302 Similarly, it is 
considered fair under Washington’s discrimination law to inquire into 
convictions from less than ten years ago (from the date of release from 
prison).303 Certain agencies and organizations, including DSHS and schools, 
are also exempt from the time restrictions for convictions. 
Where a person loses their job as a result of a conviction (or their job 
requires licensing that can be revoked), counsel should attempt to craft a 
plea that will not jeopardize the person’s employment status. In many cases, 
crafting a plea to a particular charge, even where it carries other serious 
penalties, may be preferable to one that results in dismissal from a job or 
future employment. Where a client may wish to keep an employment option 
open, determining the best way to ensure that the conviction will not 
prevent the client from remaining a viable candidate for the job may be the 
most important issue to resolve in plea negotiations. Even when a client 
loses their employment as the result of incarceration, it is still possible to 
provide advice and craft a plea that minimizes the future impact on the 
client’s life and reentry into society.304 
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I. Housing 
Increasingly, the ability to find stable housing has become an issue for 
persons who are convicted of crimes. A person returning from incarceration 
without a place to live is far more likely to re-offend than someone who has 
stable housing upon release.305 Especially when a client or their family lives 
in public housing, this consequence must be taken into consideration when 
crafting a resolution. Again, it may be that a person will be willing to suffer 
greater direct consequences if they can avoid convictions that will result in 
their exclusion from housing options. Like all consequences, the most 
important thing for the attorney to do is to assess the needs of their client 
and attempt to craft a plea that accounts for those needs. 
1. Private Housing 
In Washington State, landlords are permitted to screen and deny housing 
to individuals based on their criminal history, but landlords may not deny 
housing based upon discriminatory reasons.306 For example, a private 
landlord is not permitted to deny housing solely based on an applicant’s 
history of domestic violence without inquiring as to whether the applicant 
was the victim or perpetrator.307 Additionally, housing may not be denied 
because of a past drug addiction,308 but a private landlord may deny housing 
based on a reasonable belief that an applicant is currently engaged in illegal 
drug use.309 A landlord may deny housing based on a conviction for 
manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance.310 
The statutes governing eviction from residential property allow landlords 
to evict a person who has been arrested (whether or not convicted) for 
assault or unlawful use of a firearm or other deadly weapon on the 
premises.311 A landlord also may evict a tenant for engaging or allowing 
another to engage in gang or drug-related activity on the premises.312 
Tenants of mobile home parks may be evicted for criminal activity that 
threatens the health, safety, or welfare of the tenants.313 
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2. Public Housing 
Federal law regulates admission and eviction from housing programs 
funded through the US Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD).314 Local Public Housing Authorities (PHAs), like the Seattle 
Housing Authority, administer numerous types of HUD-funded housing 
programs including public housing projects, Section 8 voucher programs, 
and multi-family housing programs.315 Different housing providers 
receiving the same type of HUD funding may have different admission and 
eviction requirements.316 Whereas larger housing programs have stricter 
screening rules for tenants, there are no federal rules for screening the 
criminal history of applicants to some of the smaller HUD programs such as 
the Supportive Housing Program or the Low Income Housing Tax Credit.317 
Perhaps most importantly, some convictions may result in mandatory life 
bans from public housing. Households that include a registered sex 
offender318 or a person convicted of the manufacture or production of 
methamphetamines may not maintain residence on the premises of federally 
assisted housing programs.319 If an individual was evicted from federally 
assisted housing for drug-related activity, he or she faces a three-year ban 
from the date of eviction unless the housing provider determines that he or 
she has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program 
approved by the PHA, or the circumstances leading to the eviction no 
longer exist (for example, the criminal household member has died or is 
imprisoned).320 
Furthermore, a housing provider may evict residents if the provider has a 
reasonable belief that the residents are currently engaged in the illegal use 
of a controlled substance or whose pattern of illegal drug use may threaten 
the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other 
residents.321 Households believed to be engaging in a pattern of alcohol 
abuse that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the 
premises by other residents also face a ban.322 A HUD housing provider is 
permitted to exclude any household including a member who has currently 
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or recently engaged in—or even engaged in during a “reasonable time” 
before the admission’s decision323—a criminal activity that would threaten 
the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other 
residents or staff.324 HUD’s guidance policy suggests that “five years may 
be reasonable for serious offenses,” although PHAs and individual owners 
may differentiate as to what a reasonable time period is for different types 
of criminal activity.325 
Other illegal activity may result in discretionary eviction. Drug-related 
criminal activity “on or off” the premises of a public housing project is 
grounds for eviction, and it allows PHA authority to evict family members 
for the activities of other household members or guests.326 HUD-funded 
projects also consider drug-related criminal activity “on or near” the 
premises to be grounds for eviction.327 Public housing providers may evict 
persons for other criminal activities which threaten the health, safety, or 
right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents, persons 
residing in the immediate vicinity, or on-site property management staff. 
When considering an eviction, housing providers have broad discretion to 
consider all relevant circumstances.328 Finally, a federally funded housing 
provider may also evict tenants who are fleeing felons or on probation or in 
violation of their parole.329 
An attorney representing someone who lives in subsidized housing 
should advise their client that a conviction may result in eviction and the 
inability to seek future public housing. Where an eviction proceeding has 
already begun, it is generally preferable to wait until after those hearings are 
complete before resolving the criminal charge, as waiting may minimize the 
impact of the conviction on the eviction proceedings. 
J. Public Benefits 
Federal funding for public benefits is generally distributed through the 
Welfare Reform Act and a program called Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF).330 Restrictions under TANF can restrict the ability of 
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families to get necessary benefits.331 Washington’s restrictions are less 
severe than the federal restrictions but are nonetheless significant as they 
restrict new residents and alcohol or drug dependent persons.332 
Ineligibility for benefits may happen for a number of reasons. A person 
who has been convicted of a felony drug offense may need to submit to 
drug or alcohol treatment in order to continue their benefits.333 Additionally, 
a conviction for unlawful practices in obtaining cash assistance will render a 
person ineligible for cash assistance under TANF, as determined by the 
sentencing court, for at least six months.334 A felony drug conviction will 
not make a person ineligible for TANF benefits, but it may affect that 
person’s ability to receive Disability Lifeline (DL) benefits.335 
DL benefits are available for persons who meet DSHS requirements.336 A 
person is eligible for benefits if they are pregnant, incapacitated,337 in 
financial need (according to DL income and resource rules),338 meet the 
citizenship/alien status requirements,339 reside in the state of Washington,340 
and undergo referrals for assessment, treatment, or to other agencies.341 A 
person is not eligible for DL if they are in the custody of or confined in a 
public institution such as a state penitentiary or county jail, in a work 
release program, or are serving home detention.342 
“Fleeing felons”—persons who have a felony warrant out for their 
arrest—are ineligible for cash assistance and food assistance, including 
TANF, DL, and State Family Assistance (SFA). In order to be considered 
“fleeing,” the person must act with intent to avoid prosecution or 
confinement; in other words, the person must have knowledge of his or her 
warrant.343 Likewise, parole and probation violators are ineligible for cash 
assistance and food assistance under TANF, SFA, and DL.344 A person is 
violating probation or parole when a court has issued an arrest warrant for 
them after being notified by the corrections officer that the person failed to 
comply with a requirement of probation or parole.345 
Alongside criminal conviction ineligibility for many federal benefits, 
incarceration also affects a person’s receipt of Supplemental Security 
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Income (SSI), Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), and veteran’s 
benefits.346 SSI payments continue until a person has been in jail or prison 
for a full calendar month.347 SSDI payments continue until a person is 
convicted and has spent thirty days in jail or prison.348 If an SSI recipient is 
incarcerated for more than twelve consecutive months, benefits will be 
terminated entirely, and the person will have to reapply for benefits upon 
release from custody.349 SSDI recipients will not receive payments while 
they are incarcerated, yet they will not be terminated from the program no 
matter how long a period of incarceration. SSDI recipients must request a 
reinstatement of their cash benefits prior to or upon release from 
incarceration in order to start receiving them again.350 
Benefits for veterans can also be impacted by a criminal conviction. 
While a conviction will not disenfranchise a person from the benefits that 
they are entitled to receive from the Veterans Administration (VA), a 
nonappearance at a court hearing or a violation of supervision may suspend 
benefits.351 The VA suspends benefits for: (1) felony charges when there is 
an outstanding warrant; (2) felony convictions when there is an outstanding 
warrant; or (3) a violation of probation or parole when the underlying crime 
was a felony.352 Out of all persons impacted by the “fleeing felon” rule, 
including veterans, the greatest effects fall on those persons who law 
enforcement has little interest in either pursuing or actively seeking to 
warrant enforcement upon.353 As a result, it can be challenging to restore 
these benefits once a warrant is issued or a person falls out of compliance 
with supervision. 
The most important thing that a criminal defense attorney can do when 
working with a client who relies significantly on government benefits is to 
speak with a civil legal service attorney who specializes in benefits.354 As 
with consequences like immigration, it may be possible to mitigate the 
impact of the conviction on the ability of the client to continue to receive 
benefits. A carefully crafted plea, negotiated using the advice received from 
the civil legal services attorney, may make the difference in continuing to 
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be eligible for financial benefits. For “fleeing felony” issues, a criminal 
defense attorney may be successful in quashing warrants and restoring their 
client’s status with supervision so that their client can begin to receive 
benefits again. 
K. The Impact on Family Rights 
What happens in a criminal court proceeding may adversely impact other 
cases that the client has pending, and frequently, these include family court 
proceedings.355 Persons involved in criminal proceedings may also be 
involved in concurrent proceedings with DSHS, including dependency and 
termination of parental rights proceedings. Thus, the consequences of a 
criminal conviction can result in the loss of parental rights or the ability to 
foster or adopt a child.356 
When a client has concurrent proceedings in another court, it is important 
to advise them that evidence may be obtained in these hearings, including 
statements made by the client in those proceedings. Criminal history, both 
conviction and nonconviction, may be admissible in dependency 
proceedings on the issue of parental fitness.357 
Most important is the impact that the criminal proceedings can have on 
the family court matters. Certain felony convictions are considered 
“aggravated circumstances” that may result in “fast track” termination of 
parental rights.358 Additionally, unless a modification is made, child support 
obligations continue to accrue while a person is incarcerated.359 
Persons who provide foster care and are interested in adoption must also 
be aware of the impact that a conviction may have on their familial rights. 
The Washington Children’s Administration performs background checks on 
all household members sixteen years and older who are not already foster 
children.360 Certain criminal convictions of an applicant or an applicant’s 
household member may preclude licensing for a period of time.361 Under 
extremely rare circumstances, an administrative approval may be given 
when it is determined that the “conviction does not jeopardize the child’s 
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health and safety and promotes long-term stability.”362 Other convictions, 
including violent crimes and crimes against children, act as a permanent 
disqualification.363 
Adoptive parents must submit to a criminal background check as part of 
their “preplacement report” setting forth all relevant information relating to 
their fitness as an adoptive parent.364 Criminal history information—which 
includes convictions, pending charges, and arrests less than a year old—
may be included in the report, but it does not necessarily create an 
automatic bar to adoption.365 Convictions that prohibit a person from 
becoming a licensed foster parent will also bar a person from adopting a 
child through DSHS.366 
Overall, where concurrent proceedings are pending—especially where 
the client has an adoption or a license to foster children pending—it is 
important to consult with an attorney who works in family court to 
determine the best way to proceed on the criminal matter. As with all 
consequences, the outcome that will best match a family’s needs may not be 
the most obvious one to an experienced criminal defense attorney. Where 
the issue is outside the experience area of the attorney handling the case, the 
best practice is to consult with counsel who has experience in that area. 
L. Driver’s License Restrictions 
The ability to obtain a driver’s license and lawfully operate a motor 
vehicle may also be affected by a conviction. For example, offenses 
involving operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or 
controlled substances can result in a variety of suspensions and revocations 
depending upon the seriousness of the offense and the person’s prior related 
criminal history.367 Crimes that result in a suspension of at least one 
calendar year include vehicular homicide, vehicular assault, felonies 
involving a motor vehicle, failure to stop and give information or render 
aid, and perjury or the making of a false affidavit or statement under oath to 
the Department of Motor Vehicles relating to the ownership or operation of 
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motor vehicles.368 Where a person is convicted of operating a motor vehicle 
without a license in either the first or second degree, their license 
suspension will be extended.369  
Minors who are adjudicated or enter into diversion agreements on 
charges involving possession of alcohol, controlled substances, or firearms 
may also face mandatory license suspensions.370 For a first offense as a 
juvenile, the suspension is until after his or her seventeenth birthday or one 
year, whichever is longer; for a second offense, it is until the juvenile’s 
eighteenth birthday or for two years, whichever is longer.371 These 
suspensions can run consecutively until the juvenile’s twenty-first 
birthday.372 
Likewise, a person who holds a commercial driver’s license may have 
their ability to possess that license suspended or revoked for certain 
convictions.373 Suspension of a commercial driver’s license can last from 
one year for some offenses to life for others.374 
Where a person is facing a suspension, they may be eligible for a 
temporary restricted license.375 Persons who have been convicted of an 
alcohol offense may be eligible for an Ignition Interlock Driver’s License 
(IIL)376 requiring the operator to only drive a vehicle in which an interlock 
ignition device is installed. In fact, IILs have become mandatory for many 
convictions, including DUI offenses and deferred prosecutions for alcohol 
related incidents.377 Frequently, an IIL license will be issued in conjunction 
with an Occupational/Restricted Driver License (ORL).378 An ORL will 
enable a person who demonstrates need to have a temporary license 
issued.379 “Need” can be demonstrated by showing that operating the motor 
vehicle is essential for work, school, court-ordered community service, 
substance abuse treatment, health care purposes, or applying to on the job 
training.380 
Understanding when a license suspension or revocation will go into 
effect and for how long is important information for a defense attorney to be 
able to tell their client. As with all other consequences of a conviction, it 
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may be possible to mitigate or avoid these consequences through careful 
negotiation of the case. Attorneys who understand these rules and apply 
them during plea negotiations will do a good service to their clients. 
M. Loss and Restoration of Civil Rights 
A person who is convicted of a felony in Washington loses important 
civil rights upon conviction, including the right to vote and to serve on a 
jury. Other than voting rights, which may be restored earlier, a person’s 
civil rights may not be restored until all sentencing requirements are 
fulfilled including paying all legal financial obligations.381 It is important 
for a person who has decided to enter a guilty plea to understand these 
consequences and determine whether they are so important to them that 
they cannot agree to resolve the case short of trial. 
The right to vote is denied to all persons under the authority of the 
DOC,382 but it is provisionally restored when the person is no longer 
incarcerated.383 As a result, a person may still owe legal financial 
obligations to the state, yet still be able to vote. The right to vote may be 
revoked where the sentencing court determines that the person has willfully 
failed to comply with the terms of his or her order to pay legal financial 
obligations.384 The right to vote may be permanently restored where the 
restricted person has completed all their sentence obligations, including 
payment of their LFOs.385 Restoration can be completed though a court 
order, a certificate of discharge issued by either the Governor or the 
sentencing court, or a final order of discharge issued by the ISRB.386 
The right to serve on a jury is likewise denied to persons who have been 
convicted of a felony.387 The law does not provide for provisional 
restoration of this right, meaning that a person must complete all of their 
sentencing obligations in order to have this right restored.388 Once a person 
has had their civil rights restored, they may again be eligible for jury 
service.389 
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Certificates of discharge may be granted to persons who have completed 
all of their sentencing obligations, including the payment of legal financial 
obligations.390 A person who is subject to a no-contact order may still 
receive a certificate of discharge if they have fulfilled all other obligations 
of their sentence.391 A certificate of discharge shall have the effect of 
restoring all civil rights not already restored by RCW 29A.08.520.392 
Importantly, discharge will not relieve the person of obligations under no-
contact orders or from their obligation to register with the state.393 
The loss of some civil rights is an inevitable consequence of a conviction 
that, especially for felonies, cannot be avoided. As an advocate for your 
client, the important thing to do is to provide your client with information 
about what rights they will lose and the avenues that they must follow for 
restoration. 
N. Federal Student Loans 
Currently, the rules regarding federal student loans are fairly limited and 
will not apply to most persons.394 Generally, if a student is not convicted 
while enrolled in college and on a student loan, there should be no denial of 
federal financial aid.395 A student who is convicted of a drug offense while 
receiving financial aid may become ineligible to receive it any longer.396 
Nonetheless, a person who is found to be ineligible because of a drug 
conviction may have eligibility restored by attending a drug rehabilitation 
program.397 
Rules for state financial aid may be different. Because the rules for 
student loan eligibility vary by state, an attorney looking to give advice on 
this consequence must research specific rules for the state in which their 
client is attending school.398 It may be possible to craft a resolution that 
does not disqualify the student for the financial aid program in the state that 
gives them aid. For some clients, this may be an important part of the 
resolution of their cases. 
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An attorney with a client presently receiving financial aid should attempt 
to mitigate the impact of a drug conviction. It may be possible to craft a 
plea where the client can plead guilty to a reduced charge in exchange for 
more serious sanctions. Otherwise, the client could enter into an agreement 
with the state to complete certain conditions, like community service and a 
drug treatment program, to avoid a conviction. In the alternative, the 
defendant could enter into a court-monitored program—like drug court—
that would result in the dismissal of charges to remain eligible for financial 
aid.399 
O. Military Service 
While each branch of the US military has the authority to make 
exceptions, a felony conviction will generally preclude entry into any 
military service.400 Under current practice, the US Army may grant a waiver 
for certain adult felony convictions where all conditions of sentencing were 
completed over one year ago and for juvenile adjudications that are more 
than five years old.401 The other branches of the military are unlikely to 
grant waivers, except where the applicant has less than two to three 
misdemeanor convictions.402 
It is probably more important to deal with the issue of military service 
when the accused person is already serving in the military. Like 
immigration, the question of which offenses and what kind of sentences will 
or will not impact on the soldier’s continuing ability to serve is complicated. 
In fact, providing affirmative misadvice on the loss of the right to serve in 
the military is one of the consequences that Washington has recognized as a 
basis for withdrawing a guilty plea.403 In some cases, it may be advisable to 
accept a more serious charge that does not carry probation or a suspended 
sentence so that it will not impact a soldier’s ability to take an assignment 
that involves traveling overseas.404 When representing a soldier, it is best to 
consult with an attorney who specializes in military law. 
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P. Traveling Abroad 
Any conviction in Washington may result in the denial of entry or 
issuance of an entry visa to another country for the convicted person. No 
country is obligated to admit foreign nationals, and denying entry for prior 
criminal history is not uncommon. The best practice when representing a 
person who has significant ties in another country is to consult with an 
immigration attorney who practices in that county and is familiar with the 
entry practices of that nation. 
While it is extremely difficult to understand the rules of entry for every 
country in the world, it is useful for Washington attorneys to understand 
Canada’s entry rules. Under Canadian law, a foreign national may be denied 
entry to Canada for “committing an act outside of Canada that is an offence 
in the place where it was committed and that, if committed in Canada, 
would constitute an indictable offence under an Act of Parliament.”405 A 
conviction is not required, so admission may be denied to those who 
received dismissals after deferred prosecution or stipulated orders of 
continuance. Canada’s “indictable” offenses include many offenses which 
are considered only misdemeanors in the United States, including DUIs.406 
Additionally, two or more convictions for offenses that are not “indictable” 
may be grounds for inadmissibility.407 
Entry waivers into Canada are possible for persons with convictions that 
would otherwise be denied entry. A person may be “deemed rehabilitated” 
when they establish that their offense is over ten years old.408 Persons with 
convictions between five and ten years old can also pay a fee and apply for 
“rehabilitation” through the Canadian consulate.409 For convictions less than 
five years old, a person may apply for a temporary resident’s permit.410 
Members of a Native American tribe or a First Nation in Canada who 
wish to cross the border may be able to take advantage of the Jay Treaty, 
which gives them the right to cross the border between America and Canada 
without restriction.411 Eligible persons must provide evidence of native 
heritage412 sufficient to show that the bearer is at least 50 percent Native 
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American or First Nation heritage.413 Qualified persons may then be 
admitted to the United States without a visa, unencumbered by typical 
immigration restrictions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, including 
the sections which bar admission of those with criminal convictions.414 
While the ability to travel abroad is unlikely to be considered a drastic 
measure by the courts, it may still be an important consideration for some 
clients. If this is identified as an issue for a particular client, counsel should 
attempt to determine whether a particular disposition will result in exclusion 
from the country that the client is seeking to travel to. As with all 
consequences, it may not be possible to craft a resolution that 
accommodates this concern and other concerns of the client simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, the most important thing that an attorney can do is identify 
the issue for his or her client and inform them of the consequences so that 
they can make an informed decision with respect to their ability to travel. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The obligation to provide competent representation existed well before 
Padilla clarified the rule regarding consequences that are intimately related 
to the criminal process and an integral part of the penalty.415 Competent 
counsel must not only analyze the facts of their client’s case and investigate 
appropriately, but counsel must also provide accurate advice regarding the 
consequences of a guilty plea or conviction. When an attorney ascertains 
their client’s objectives for litigation and acts within those interests, he or 
she meets the obligations set by the Supreme Court in Strickland and 
Padilla as well as those affirmed in Washington in A.N.J. and Sandoval. 
The analysis for determining whether an attorney is effective with regard to 
the consequences of a conviction are no different than they are with regard 
to any other obligation expected of competent counsel. Competent counsel 
must understand the impact of the conviction on the client’s objectives and 
seek a resolution that is in accord with those goals. Where the attorney 
properly advises a client with regard to consequences that are important to 
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him or her, the attorney has provided competent representation and satisfied 
the standard for effective assistance of counsel. It is then up to the 
defendant to determine the best course of action for their particular case. 
In many cases, the consequences discussed in this article cannot be 
avoided. Often, it is up to the client to determine which of the adverse 
consequences they are confronting are acceptable to them in resolving their 
case. There may be circumstances where a client may agree to more 
incarceration to avoid certain other consequences such as deportation, 
registration, or the ability to continue to serve in the military. Where a 
consequence will have a drastic impact on a particular client’s future, it may 
be in his or her best interest to spend more time in custody than to deal with 
that future impact. Ultimately, the role of competent counsel is to ensure 
that their client understands the impacts that a particular resolution will 
have on their future. When the client is fully informed with regard to those 
consequences, they have received effective assistance of counsel. 
Courts must now analyze all consequences of a conviction under the 
standard laid out by Padilla and affirmed in Sandoval. Where the court 
finds that a consequence is “intimately related to the criminal process” and 
an “integral part of the penalty,” yet the attorney failed to advise their client 
regarding the consequence, the court should apply the Strickland analysis to 
determine whether a valid claim of ineffective assistance exists. In many 
cases, the court may deny the claim upon a finding that prejudice was not 
established, even where the defendant is able to show that the consequence 
was an integral part of the penalty. In those circumstances, where the 
defendant is able to demonstrate prejudice and that the consequence was an 
integral part of the penalty, the client should be entitled to withdraw their 
plea, regardless of whether the consequence is a traditional direct or 
collateral consequence.416 It is under these circumstances that the guarantees 
of the Sixth Amendment of the US Constitution and Article 1, sec. 22 of the 
Washington State Constitution are met. 
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83 A complete discussion of these issues will be addressed more completely below infra 
§§ III (G), (K), (M), and (O). 
84 See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010). 
85 Id. 
86 See generally WASH. DEFENDER ASS’N., BEYOND THE CONVICTION: WHAT DEFENSE 
ATTORNEYS IN WASHINGTON NEED TO KNOW ABOUT COLLATERAL AND OTHER NON-
CONFINEMENT CONSEQUENCES (2010); available at http://www.defensenet.org, follow 
“Resources,” click on “Publications.” 
87 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (“[N]oncitizen defendants 
facing a risk of deportation for a particular offense find it even more difficult” to separate 
the penalty for conviction from deportation); see also State v. Sandoval, 249 P.3d 1015, 
1017 (Wash. 2011) (The defendant “did not want to plead guilty if the plea would result 
in his deportation.”). 
88 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480. 
89 See id. at 1481 (“We, however, have never applied a distinction between direct and 
collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional 
assistance’ required under Strickland.”). 
90 See id. 
91 Id. at 1482, 1486. 
92 Id. at 1476. 
93 Id. at 1484 (stating that to limit the holding to affirmative misadvice would “invite 
absurd . . . results”). 
94 See id. at 1483. 
95 Id. 
96 State v. Sandoval, 249 P.3d 1015, 1021 (Wash. 2011).  
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97 Id. at 1022 (citing Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1947)). 
98 Id. (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484 (2010)). 
99 See id. 
100 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010). 
101 For an in-depth discussion of these models, see SEJAL ZOTA & JOHN RUBIN, 
IMMIGRATION ASSISTANCE FOR INDIGENT DEFENDERS (AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
SOCIETY FOR LAW AND POLICY OCTOBER 2010) available at 
http://www.acslaw.org/files/Zota%20Rubin%20-%20Immigration%20Assistance.pdf. 
102  Detailed overview of the resources provided by WDA’s Immigration Project available 
at http://www.defensenet.org/immigration-project. 
103 See id. 
104 But see Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483; State v. Sandoval, 249 P.3d 1015, 1022 (Wash. 
2011) (“We think Sandoval would have been rational to take his chances at trial.”). 
105 A guilty plea is involuntary if the defendant is not properly advised of a direct 
consequence of his plea. See State v. Turlev, 69 P.3d 338, 341 (Wash. 2003); State v. 
Ross, 916 P.2d 405, 408 (Wash. 1996); see also In re the Personal Restraint of Isadore, 
88 P.3d 390, 392 (Wash. 2004) (“A guilty plea is not knowingly made when it is based 
on misinformation of sentencing consequences.”) 
106 Compare Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010); with Sandoval, 249 P.3d 
at 1022 (“We think Sandoval would have been rational to take his chances at trial.”). 
Other consequences that may matter more than the length of the sentence to a particular 
person will be discussed in detail below. 
107 See Turlev, 69 P.3d at 341; Ross, 916 P.2d at 408; see also In re the Personal Restraint 
of Isadore, 88 P.3d at 392. 
108 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A governs sentencing of felony offenses; See WASH. REV. 
CODE § 9.94A.010 (2011). 
109 The Sentencing Reform Act is codified in WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.010–
9.94A.930 (2011). The Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission maintains 
the present and all past manuals online. See Publications, WASH. STATE SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES COMM’N, http://www.sgc.wa.gov/Informational/Publications.htm (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
110 The maximum sentence for a gross misdemeanor is 365 days. WASH. REV. CODE § 
9A.20.021(3) (2011). The maximum sentence for a misdemeanor is ninety days. WASH. 
REV. CODE § 9A.20.021(4) (2011). 
111 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535 (2011). 
112 A complete list of the seriousness level for each felony can be found at WASH. REV. 
CODE § 9.94A.515 (2011). 
113 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(14)(11)(a) (2011) (including the defendant’s prior 
adult convictions and juvenile court dispositions in any state or in federal court as a part 
of a defendant’s criminal history). 
114 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535 (2011). 
115 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.537(6) (2011); see also Blakely v. Wash., 542 U.S. 
296, 301 (2004) (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the proscribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
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116 Sentence enhancements may be based upon possession of a firearm or deadly weapon, 
criminal street gang activity, whether the crime was committed in a protected zone, the 
presence of a child and when the crime is for sexual motivation. See WASH. REV. CODE § 
9.94A.533 (2011).  
117 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.537(3) (2011). An exclusive list of aggravating 
factors can be found at WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94.535(2)–(3) (2011). 
118 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535(1) (2011). 
119 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.507(3)(b) (2011). 
120 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.570 (2011). 
121 See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.507 (2011). 
122 See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.507(3)(b) (2011). 
123 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.507(c)(i) (2011). 
124 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(36) (2011) (defining “persistent offender”). 
“Three Strikes and You’re Out” was approved by voters in 1993 and became effective on 
December 2, 1993. The “Two Strike” law was enacted by the 1997 legislature. 
125 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.570 (2011). 
126 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(31) (2011). 
127 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(34) (2011). 
128 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(36)(b) (2011). 
129 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.570 (2011). 
130 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.729(1) (2011). 
131 An offense committed after July 1, 2003, that results in a conviction for a serious 
violent offense or a class A felony sex offense may entitle the offender to receive no 
more than ten percent good time. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.729(3)(a) (2011); see also 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.729(3)(d) (2011) (stating that under no circumstances shall 
“shall the aggregate earned release time exceed one-third of the total sentence.”). For 
offences committed on or after July 1, 1990, and before July 1, 2003, earned release time 
for these offenses may be up to fifteen percent. 
132 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.729(5)(b) (2011). Where the DOC is unable to 
approve the release plan, it may transfer the offender to partial confinement or provide 
rental vouchers, if they will result in an approved release plan. See WASH. REV. CODE § 
9.94A.729(5)(d)(i)–(ii) (2011). 
133 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.729(2) (2011). 
134 See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.729(1)(a)–(b) (2011); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 
9.92.151 (Early 2011) (early release for good behavior). 
135 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.729(1)(b) (2011). 
136 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021(2)–(3) (2011) (applying to crimes committed July 
1, 1984 and after); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.020 (2011) (gross misdemeanors); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 9.92.030 (2011) (misdemeanors). 
137 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021(2)–(3) (2011). 
138 See WASH. REV. CODE § 3.66.067 (2011). 
139 See WASH. REV. CODE § 3.66.069 (2011). 
140 See In re the Personal Restraint of Isadore, 88 P.3d 390, 392 (Wash. 2004). 
141 See id. 
142 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.501(1) (2011). 
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143  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.701–704 (2011). 
144 Supervision is mandatory for some superior court misdemeanors and gross 
misdemeanors sentences requiring probation, sex offenses (felony or misdemeanor), 
serious violent offenses, dangerous mentally ill offenders, those under the jurisdiction of 
the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board, those subject to the Interstate Compact, 
offenders sentenced under the Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative, those under the 
Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative, or the First time Offender Waiver. WASH. 
REV. CODE § 9.94A.501 (2011). 
145 See id. 
146 Supervision for sex and serious violent offenders is thirty-six months. For violent 
offenders it is eighteen months. For persons convicted of crimes against persons, drug 
offenses, and offenses involving unlawful possession of a firearm by a gang member, 
supervision is for twelve months. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.701 (2011). 
147 Supervision for a misdemeanor may be for up to five years, depending upon the 
offense. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95A.204 (2011). 
148 For a full list of the conditions which a court may impose see WASH. REV. CODE § 
9.94A.703 (2011). 
149 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.714. (2011). 
150 Before the enactment of the SRA, for offenses that occurred prior to July 1, 1984, all 
persons convicted of felonies in Washington were sentenced under the indeterminate 
sentencing system. Persons were given a maximum sentence by the court at the time of 
sentencing. The ISRB then set a minimum sentence, at which time the offender could be 
considered for release. Where the ISRB finds a person “rehabilitated and a fit subject for 
release,” WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.100, parole can be authorized. If the board does not 
release the person at that hearing, a new hearing must be set within sixty months. There is 
no right to release until the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed. 
151  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.011(2). The SRA does not apply to crimes that were 
committed prior to July 1, 1984. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.905. 
152 See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.507 (2011). 
153 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.011(2)(b) (2011). 
154  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.507. (2011). 
155 See INDETERMINATE SENTENCE REVIEW BD., INDETERMINATE SENTENCE REVIEW 
BOARD AT A GLANCE (2010), http://www.srb.wa.gov/documents/ISRB%20AT%20A% 
20GLANCE.pdf (indicating that those serving determinate plus sentences are slightly 
more likely to be released than offenders serving sentences for offenses which occurred 
prior to July 1, 1984). 
156 In setting a new minimum term, the board may consider the length of time necessary 
for the offender to complete treatment and programming as well as other factors that 
relate to the offender’s release under WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.420. The board’s rules 
shall permit an offender to petition for an earlier review if circumstances change or the 
board receives new information that would warrant an earlier review. See WASH. REV. 
CODE § 9.95.011(2)(c) (2011). 
157 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.011(2)(b) (2011). 
158 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130 (2011) for a list of the offenses requiring 
registration. 
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159 See generally Kevin Brown, et al., The Reintegration of Sex Offenders: Barriers and 
Opportunities for Employment, 46 HOWARD J. CRIM. JUST. 32 (2007). 
160 See generally Jill Levenson & Leo Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender Residence 
Restrictions: 1,000 Feet From Danger or One Step From Absurd?, 49(2) INT’L J. 
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 168 (2005). 
161 See generally State v. A.N.J., 225 P.3d 956, 968 (Wash. 2010). While A.N.J. relies 
upon affirmative misadvice, this rule predates Sandoval, which extends the rule for 
immigration advice to requiring affirmative advice. See also State v. Stowe, 858 P.2d 
267, 270 (Wash. 1993) (When there are “additional consequences of an unquestionable 
serious nature . . . .it may be manifestly unjust to hold the defendant to his earlier 
bargain.”). 
162 See Brown, supra note 153; Levenson & Cotter, supra note 154. 
163 See E.K. DRAKE & S. AOS, DOES SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION 
REDUCE CRIME? A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH LITERATURE (2009), 
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/09-06-1101.pdf. The Washington State Institute for 
Public Policy has done considerable work on the issue of the effectiveness of registration 
on sex offender policy, including this meta-analysis. 
164 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130(1)(a) (2011). 
165 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130 (2011). Classification is from Level I to Level III, 
with Level III being the most likely to reoffend. 
166 See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.550(53) (2011). 
167 See id. 
168 See id. The Department of Corrections also has useful information, including the risk 
assessment tool on their website. See generally End of Sentence Review Comm., WASH. 
STATE DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, http://www.doc.wa.gov/community/sexoffenders/endof 
sentence.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
169 Failure to register as a sex offender is also an additional sex offense. See WASH. REV. 
CODE § 9A.44.132 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.140 (2011). 
170 See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.140 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.142 
(2011). 
171 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.142(1)(b) (2011). 
172 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.140(2) (2011). 
173 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.140(1) (2011). 





179 See State v. A.N.J., 225 P.3d 956, 968 (2010). 
180 See id. 
181 Id. 
182 See id. 
183 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484 (2010) (stating that there is no relevant 
difference “between an act of commission and an act of omission”); see also Strickland v. 
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Wash., 466 U.S. 668, 690 (“The court must then determine whether, in light of all the 
circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance.”). 
184 See State v. Sandoval, 249 P.3d 1015, 1022 (Wash. 2011) (“Given the severity of the 
deportation consequence, we think Sandoval would have been rational to take his chances 
at trial.”). 
185 See generally Patricia M. Harris & Kimberly S. Keller, 2005, Ex-Offenders Need Not 
Apply: The Criminal Background Check in Hiring Decisions,” 21 J. CONT. CRIM. JUST 6 
(2005). 
186 See Crime & Safety, WASH. STATE PATROL, http://www.wsp.wa.gov/crime 
/crimhist.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
187 See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.045 (2011). 
188 See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.050 (2011). Many state agencies, including criminal 
justice agencies and DHSH, have free access to all criminal history information, 
including all past arrests. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.100 (2011). 
189 See WASH. REV. CODE § § 43.43.730; 10.97.080 (2011). 
190 Only nonconviction data may be expunged or destroyed as there is no provision that 
allows for the expungement or destruction of an adult conviction record. See WASH. REV. 
CODE § 10.97.030(2) (2011) (defining “nonconviction data”); WASH. REV. CODE § 
10.97.060. (2011). 
191 See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.95.240, 9.94A.640(3) (2011). 
192 WASH. CT. R. GENERAL APPLICATION 15(c)(2). 
193 See Koenig v. Thurston County, 229 P.3d 910 (Wash. 2010) (holding that Special Sex 
Offender Sentencing Alternative evaluations are not exempt from Public Records Act 
disclosure, even where the court copy had been placed under seal). 
194 See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(48) (2011) (defining violent crimes); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.830(5) (2011) (defining crimes against children and other 
persons). 
195 See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.640(2) (2011). 
196 See id. 
197 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.96.060 (2011). 
198 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.96.060(2)(a) (2011). 
199 Vacation is not available for misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor DUIs, sex offenses, 
obscenity or pornography charges under WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.68.15–9.68.140, sexual 
exploitation of children under WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.68A.001–9.68A.150, or violent 
offenses or attempt to commit violent offenses under WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030. 
200 See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.50.050(12) (2011). 
201 See id. 
202 See id. 
203 See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.040(1) (2011). Generally, no consumer reporting 
agency may make a consumer report containing any juvenile records, as defined in RCW 
13.50.010(1)(c), when the subject of the records is twenty-one years of age or older at the 
time of the report. 
204 See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.050 (2011). 
205 See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.030(2) (2011). 
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206 See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.060 (2011). 
207 See generally WASH. CT. GENERAL R. 15. 
208  WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.050 (2011). 
209 Washington Law Help maintains a current guide on steps to take to vacate or seal a 
conviction. See Washington Law Help, Criminal History/Records: A Guide on When and 
How to Vacate Non-Violent Class B or C Felony Convictions Occurring on or after July 
1, 1984 at 1, http://www.washingtonlawhelp.org/documents/1988619910EN.pdf?state 
abbrev=/WA/. 
210 See generally State v. A.N.J., 225 P.3d 956, 969 (2010) (“A conviction as a juvenile 
sex offender will have a significant impact on his life.”). 
211 See generally Eric Holte & Travis Stearns, A Public Defender’s Guide to Legal 
Financial Obligations in Superior Court (2010), http://www.washingtonlawhelp.org/ 
documents/472631WDAGuidetoLegalFinancialObligationsLFOs.pdf?stateabbrev=/wa/ 
(providing for a more complete analysis of legal financial obligations). 
212 See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760 (2011). 
213 See id. Under current law, superior court judges may now impose up to seventeen fees 
and fines on felony defendants at the time of sentencing. District court may also impose 
fines and fees, in addition to restitution. 
214 See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.035 (2011). 
215 See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.7541 (2011). 
216 See KATHERINE BECKETT, ET AL., WASH. STATE MINORITY AND JUSTICE COMM., 
THE ASSESSMENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS IN 
WASHINGTON STATE 3 (2008), http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/2008 
LFO_report.pdf; see also ALICIA BANNON, Diller, ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A 
BARRIER TO REENTRY (2010), http://brennan.3cdn.net/c610802495d901dac3_76m 
6vqhpy.pdf. 
217 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW 
DEBTORS’ PRISONS 6 (2010), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny_web.pd 
f#page=6. 
218 BECKETT, supra note 205, at 11. 
219 Id. 
220 See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090 (2011). 
221  WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.0090(2) (2011) allows the court to reduce or waive 
interest on LFOs if the offender has shown that he or she has “personally made a good 
faith effort to pay, that the interest accrual is causing a significant hardship, and that he or 
she will be unable to pay the principal and interest in full” and that “reduction or waiver 
of the interest will likely enable the offender to pay the full principal and any remaining 
interest.” A “good faith effort” means payment of the principal in full or twenty-four 
consecutive monthly payments, excluding payments mandatorily deducted by DOC. The 
court may not waive interest on the restitution portion of the LFO and may only reduce it 
if the principal of the restitution has been paid in full. 
222 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.753(3) (2011). 
223 See id. 
224 See id. 
225 See id. 
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226 See id. 
227 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.753(5) (2011). 
228 See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.200 (2011). 
229 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021 (2011). 
230 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.550 (2011). 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021 (2011). 
234 See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760 (2011). 
235 See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.690 (2011). 
236  WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.035 (2011). 
237  WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.160(3) (2011). 
238 See Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 45 (1974); State v. Barklind, 557 P.2d 314, 317 
(Wash. 1977). 
239 Where restitution has been imposed, it may not be later waived by a court. 
240  WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.160(4) (2011). Due process also precludes the jailing of a 
person for failure to pay his or her fine if that person’s failure to pay was due to his or her 
indigence. See Smith v. Whatcom Cnty. Dist. Ct., 52 P.3d 485, 492 (Wash. 2002) citing 
Bearden v. Ga., 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983). 
241 See Fuller, 417 U.S. at 46; see also State v. Curry, 829 P.2d 166, 168–69 (Wash. 
1992). 
242 See Fuller, 417 U.S. at 46. 
243 See id. Following Fuller, the Oregon court explicitly declared that the remission 
statute at issue in Fuller (which is practically identical to WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.160) 
required a manifest hardship analysis and that the test employed at sentencing to decide 
whether LFOs should be part of a sentence was “inapposite by its terms.” Hernandez-
Reyes v. Lampert, 35 P.3d 1066, 1068 (Or. 2001); see also Barklind, 557 P.2d at 317, but 
cf. State v. Blank, 930 P.2d 1213, 1316 (Wash. 1997) (analyzing WASH. REV. CODE § 
10.73.160(4) regarding remission of appellate costs and explaining that the consideration 
of remission requires a manifest hardship test based on the circumstances of the movant 
at the time of the remission motion). 
244 Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53 (1974). 
245 See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 10.101.020 (2011). 
246 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760 (2011). 
247 See id. 
248 Wash. v. Nason, 233 P.3d 848, 851 (Wash. 2010). 
249 Bearden v. Ga., 461 U.S. 660, 660 (1983). 
250 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94B.040(3)(b) (2011); see Smith v. Whatcom Cnty Dist. 
Ct., 52 P.3d 485, 492 (2002). 
251 See Smith, 52 P.3d at 492. 
252 State v. Blank, 930 P.2d 1213, 1220 (Wash. 1997). 
253 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.633 (2011). 
254 See generally Alexes Harris, et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and 
Social Inequality in the Contemporary U.S., 115 AM. J. SOC. 1755 (2010). 
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255 See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment protects 
an individual’s right to possess a firearm for private use); McDonald v. Chi., 130 S. Ct. 
3020 (2010) (holding that the right to keep and bear arms is incorporated by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and applies to the States). 
256 But cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel regarding immigration consequences of a guilty plea); 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (Second Amendment right to possess firearms). 
257 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.040 (2011) (unlawful possession of a firearm); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 9.41.045 (2011) (firearm possession by an offender); WASH. REV. CODE § 
9.41.047 (2011) (restoration of possession rights). 
258 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.040 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.047 (2011). 
259 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2002). 
260 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2002). 
261 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2002). 
262 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2002). 
263 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922. (2002). 
264 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.040047 (2011). A person may have their right to 
possess a firearm restored without having other civil rights restored under a certificate of 
discharge. Restoration of firearm rights is based upon time spent crime free and not upon 
completion of the obligations under a sentence. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.040 (2011). 
See also State v. Mihali, 218 P.3d 922 (Wash. 2009). 
265 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94.040(4)(b)(i) (2011). 
266 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.040(4)(b)(ii) (2011). 
267 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). But see U.S. v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002) (The federal district 
court had no authority to restore petitioner’s right to possess firearms even where 
Congress has refused to provide a process through the ATF for restoration of rights). 
268  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94.040(b)(i) (2011). 
269 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2002) (domestic violence charges). But see WASH. REV. 
CODE § 9.94.040(4)(b)(i) (2011) (general restoration rights for felons). 
270 Notification is included in the pattern Guilty Plea Form maintained by the Washington 
Courts. See Court Forms: Guilty Pleas, WASH. COURTS, http://www.courts.wa.gov/forms 
/?fa=forms.contribute&formID=21 (last visited Mar. 28, 2011). 
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